Volume 113
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 113,
2008-2009
3-1-2009

The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration
Andrea K. Bjorklund

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 DICK. L. REV. 1269 (2009).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol113/iss4/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

The Emerging Civilization of Investment
Arbitration
Andrea K. Bjorklund*
Table of Contents
OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCE ..................

1273

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

ProceduralInfirmities ......................................................
Objections Ratione Personae ............................................
Objections Ratione Materiae ............................................
JurisdictionRatione Temporis ..........................................
Frivolous Claim s ..............................................................
TRAN SPARENCY .......................................................................
A . Access to Information .......................................................
B. Am icus Participation........................................................

1275
1277
1280
1282
1285

III.

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRECEDENT .....................

1294

IV.

ARBITRATOR ETHICS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ...............

V.

CON CLUSION ............................................................................

1297
1300

I.

II.

1286

1288
1290

In 1993 Samuel Huntington wrote about a looming clash of
civilizations-what he predicted would be a cataclysmic showdown
between civilizations characterized by different religions, history,
languages, and traditions.' Investment arbitration can also be viewed as
a clash (albeit non-violent) of civilizations. It is where international
commercial arbitration runs into both techniques borrowed from U.S.style no-holds-barred litigation and the staid and measured practice
common before international tribunals such as the International Court of
Justice; where public international law principles vie for supremacy with
municipal law and the lex mercatoria; where common law emphasis on
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. I am grateful
to Sedn Duggan and Meg Kinnear for comments and suggestions. Any errors, of course,
remain my responsibility. I also thank the librarians at U.C. Davis for their customary
prompt assistances and Deans Johnson and Amar for research support.
1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer
1993, at 22.
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case law meets civil law emphasis on treaty (code) provisions. One
could view proponents of each of these practices as bent on a civilizing
mission, much like those professed by the former colonial powers as they
sought to build empires in their preferred styles.2 Competing arbitration
colonizers seek to control investment arbitration and to imbue it with
their preferred attributes, but none has yet prevailed. Instead one is
beginning to see the evolution of a sui generis civilization that is
combining elements of many pre-existing practices to create new norms
suitable for the specialized mode of practice occasioned by the hybrid
nature of investment arbitration.3
Investment arbitration often involves public international law
grafted onto a substructure of private commercial arbitration. All
arbitration is based on consent. A state's consent to the settlement of an
investment dispute by arbitration can arise from a contract between the
state and a foreign investor with respect to a particular project, from
investment legislation passed by the state, or from an investment treaty
between the state and the home state of the investor. Investment
arbitration based on a contract is the most similar to regular commercial
arbitration. The subject matter of the dispute is identified in advance and
described in the contract between the investor and the state, and the
governing law is ordinarily municipal law, although public international
law can play a role. Given the significant number of investment treaties,
arbitration based on investment legislation is now rare. Investment treaty
arbitration, on the other hand, is blossoming.4 A state, via an investment
treaty, effectively offers advance consent to the settlement by arbitration
of future disputes that are currently undefined but that are related to
investments owned or controlled by foreign investors. 5 The claims
against the state are usually based on international legal obligations
found in the treaty, some of which are based on customary international
law, such as the obligation not to expropriate except for a public purpose,
without discrimination,6 and on payment of prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation.

2. See, e.g., MORT ROSENBLUM, MISSION TO CIVILIZE: THE FRENCH WAY 155-75
(1986) (describing in particular the manner in which France built its empire).
3. Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Nature of Investment Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 151 (2004).
4. By the end of 2006, there were at least 290 cases. UNCTAD, Latest
developments in investor-State dispute Settlement, IIA MONITOR No. 1 (2008), at 1. This
number represents known treaty-based cases, but does not include confidential treatybased cases or those based solely on concession contracts. Id. at 1-2, n. 1.
5. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REv.-F.I.L.J. 232 (1995).
6. See, e.g., August Reinisch, Legality of Expropriations, in STANDARDS OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 171, 172-78 (August Reinisch ed., 2008); RuDOLF DOLZER &
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 89-96 (2008);
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Many investment arbitrations, whether contract- or treaty-based, are
held under the auspices of the Convention for Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the "ICSID
Convention" or "Convention"). 7 The Convention, which entered into
force in 1966, offers a neutral forum for the settlement of investment
disputes.8 Consent to arbitrate a particular dispute under the ICSID
Convention must be found elsewhere, as a state's ratification of the
Convention means only that dispute settlement under the Convention is
available in appropriate circumstances. 9
For ICSID Convention
arbitration to be available, both the host state of the investment and the
home state of the investor must be party to the Convention.' 0 If only one
party is covered by the Convention, the arbitration may be held under the
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or under other rules as the consent to
arbitration permits."l Aside from those of the ICSID Convention and the
ICSID Additional Facility, arbitral rules frequently employed in
investment disputes include the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Rules, and the London Court of
International Arbitration Rules, which were designed for use in
commercial arbitrations, but which have shown themselves adaptable to
use in investor-State disputes. 12
Arbitrating under the ICSID Convention adds a public international
law dimension even to contract-based investment disputes. Article 42 of
the ICSID Convention is a choice-of-law clause that sets forth the laws to
which an arbitral tribunal should turn when deciding disputes.
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of
law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such
agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State

CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WE1NIGER, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 207-21, 286-297 (2007).

7. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, 575 U.N.T.S. (1966) 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
8.
9.

10.

Id.
LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 7, 21-23 (2004).

Id. at 7.

11. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 223-25; MCLACHLAN, SHORE &
WEINIGER, supra note 6, at 46-50; ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LUiS PARADELL, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 72-73 (2008).
12. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 225-29; MEG KINNEAR, ANDREA K.
BJORKLUND & JoHN F.G. HANNAFORD, INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: AN

ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA §§ 1120.8-1120.11 (2008); August Reinisch & Loretta
Malintoppi,

Methods

of Dispute Resolution, in

THE OXFORD

HANDBOOK

OF

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 691, 707-12 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino &
Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).
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party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and
such rules of international law as may be applicable.13
In practice, tribunals tend to turn to international law for gap-filling
purposes. 4 In addition, arbitrating under the ICSID Convention also
means that the dispute must meet the jurisdictional requirements of the
ICSID Convention as well as any jurisdictional limitations contained in
the governing treaty or investment agreement.
All of the procedural rules, whether designed specifically for use in
commercial arbitrations or not, are based on commercial arbitration
practice. Arbitrators are selected on an ad hoc basis to decide a
particular dispute. Usually they sit in panels of three, with each party
selecting one arbitrator, and the presiding arbitrator chosen either by
consent of the parties, by the party-appointed arbitrators, or by an
appointing authority if one of other applicable mechanisms fails. ICSID
Convention is anational in that there is no "place of arbitration" whose
law governs the procedure of the arbitration. 15 In non-ICSID Convention
cases (including those brought under the ICSID Additional Facility), the
place of arbitration is selected anew for each dispute. The selection of
place of arbitration is a decision that can have important implications for
the conduct of the arbitration as well as for the validity of any subsequent
award. 16
This marriage of public international law and international
commercial arbitration has not always produced harmonious results.
Particularly in investment treaty disputes, states have launched
jurisdictional objections that add complexity and, usually, time to the
arbitral proceedings. These often involve the elaboration of public
international law principles regarding the nationality of claimants in
addition to the elaboration of a procedural regime peculiar to investment
arbitration. The confidentiality requirements of the rules under which
investment disputes have usually been held have been challenged by

13.

ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 42.

14.

CHRISTOPH

SCHREUER,

THE ICSID

CONVENTION:

A COMMENTARY

621-31

(2001).
15. See REED, supra note 9, at 8 (noting the delocalized and self-contained nature of
ICSID Convention proceedings).
16. The arbitral law of the place of arbitration governs what kinds of assistance local
courts can provide to an arbitral tribunal, including ordering provisional measures in aid
of arbitration and ordering parties and even non-parties to provide evidence to the
tribunal. See, e.g., FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, & GOLDMAN, ON ARBITRATION 710-28
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); JULIAN D.M. LEW, LotuKAs A. MISTELIS
& STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 355-77,
580-83, 616-25 (2003). Arbitral awards are subject to vacatur in the national courts of
the place of arbitration. See, e.g., FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, & GOLDMAN, supra, at 902-16;
LEW, MISTELIS & KROLL, supra, at 373-76, 667-83.
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international civil society as improperly secretive and adverse to the
public interest. Gradually, albeit slowly, some transparency norms are
developing, along with the possibility of participation in hearings by
amici curiae. Notwithstanding the general rule in public international
law that case law has no precedential value, arbitral awards are
increasingly used as persuasive authority both by advocates and by
tribunals. 17 The status of those awards as influential sources of authority
has caused increasing problems with respect to arbitrator conflicts of
interest.
The aforementioned characteristics of investment treaty
civilization are inter-related and reinforce each other. For example, the
public availability of arbitral awards facilitates the subsequent referral to
prior awards in the development of a jurisprudence constante in
international investment law. 18 Reference to prior awards has led to
more complex ethical issues for investment arbitrators. 19 Some of these
issues will be resolved, but many more will emerge as investment
arbitration continues its evolution to a fully-fledged legal system.
I.

OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCE

Jurisdictional objections are not unique to investment arbitration.
The principle of compdtence-comp6tence-that arbitrators are
empowered to decide whether or not they have the authority to hear the
dispute before them--developed in the context of commercial
arbitration. z Jurisdictional objections in the commercial context tend to

17.

See, e.g.,

Andrea

K.

Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Awards as

Jurisprudence Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF
THE DISCIPLINE 265 (Douglas Arner, Isabella Bunn & Colin Picker eds., 2008)
[hereinafter Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Awards]; Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent
and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM J. INT'L L. 1014 (2007);
Jeffery P. Commission, Precedentin Investment Treaty Arbitration:A Citation Analysis
of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 129 (2007); Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, The 2006 Freshfields Lecture-Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity, or
Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357 (2007); Jan Paulsson, Awards-and Awards, in INVESTMENT
TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES Ii 95 (Andrea K. Bjorklund, Ian A. Laird & Sergey
Ripinsky eds., 2008); Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 12, at 1188.
18. See, e.g., Thomas W. Wilde, The Present State of Research, in NEW ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 2004 (2006); Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral
Awards, supra note 17.
19. See Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Awards, supra note 17, at 279-80;
Loretta Malintoppi, Arbitrators' Independence and Impartiality, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 12, at 789, 802-07.
20. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2009); John J. Barcel6, Il, Who
Decides the Arbitrators' Jurisdiction? Separability and Compitence-Comptence in
TransnationalPerspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1115 (2003); LEW, MISTELIS &
KROLL, supra note 16, at 332-54; William W. Park, DeterminingArbitral Jurisdiction:
Allocation of Tasks between Courts and Arbitrators, 9 ARB. & Disp. RESOL. L.J. 19
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focus on whether the claims are within the scope of the parties'
agreement to submit a claim to arbitration.21 Objections usually fall
within two categories. First, is the subject matter of the claim so broad,
e.g., does it involve both tort claims and contract claims, that it should be
viewed as outside the competence of the arbitrators? Second, is there
some doubt as to whether the parties actually agreed to seek resolution of
the dispute by arbitration? Certainly counsel have been creative in their
use of these arguments, but investor-State cases offer even greater
flexibility for respondent states to attempt disposing of the case early on
jurisdictional grounds. States have also argued that certain claims are
inadmissible; that notwithstanding a tribunal's authority to hear the case,
it should decline to exercise it in the given case.22
Most investment treaties offer advance consent to cases provided
certain conditions are met by the investor seeking to submit a claim.23
They also have temporal limitations and restrictions based on
nationality. 24 Cases governed by the ICSID Convention offer even more
opportunities for jurisdictional objections. For example, claimants must
satisfy the definition of investment under the ICSID Convention, as well
as under an investment treaty, if one applies.25 The same is true with
respect to nationality requirements. Recent amendments to the ICSID
Convention, as well as some recent U.S. bilateral investment treaties
("BITs") and free trade agreements, have special provisions on frivolous
claims that permit states to have expedited hearings on claims that are
apparently without merit or that fail to state a cause of action on which
relief can be granted.26
(2000); Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know about "Separability" in
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1 (2003).
21.
ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY, & CONSTANTINE
PARTASIDES, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 248 (4th

ed. 2004) (noting that an arbitral tribunal derives its authority from the consent of the
parties, and that it must stay within its terms of reference, competence, or authority).
22. For an excellent discussion of the distinction between objections to jurisdiction
and admissibility, see Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in GLOBAL
REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL

LAW, COMMERCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, LIBER

AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 601, 601-08 (Gerald Aksen et al. eds., 2005)
23. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 242-43; Andrea K. Bjorklund,

NAFTA Chapter 11: Contract Without Privity: Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance,
2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 183 (2001).
24. See, e.g., MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 6, at 131-62 (discussing
nationality); KINNEAR, BJORKLUND & HANNAFORD, supra note 12, at §§ 1116.5-1116.15,
1116.20-1116.27 (discussing nationality) & §§ 1116.28-1116.31 (discussing jurisdiction
ratione temporis).
25. SCHREUER, supra note 14, at 121-41; Devashish Krishan, A Notion of ICSID
Investment, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (T.J.
Grierson Weiler ed., 2008).
26. See, e.g., ICSID RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
(ARBITRATION ADDITIONAL FACILITIES RULES) Ch. VIII, art. 45(6) (2006) ("Unless the
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States have been extremely active in raising objections to
jurisdiction and admissibility. 27 This is, in part, a natural tendency for a
defendant. It is also a feature of the advance and imprecise nature of the
consent given in investment treaties. When the actual dispute presents
itself, a state might very readily assert that such a dispute was not the
kind of dispute it contemplated when it signed the applicable treaty.
Moreover, investment arbitration is extremely costly and time
consuming. For example, in PSEG v. Turkey, costs and legal fees
amounted to $20,851,636.62,28 and UPS v. Canada took seven years to
arbitrate. 29 States thus have a strong incentive to eliminate or narrow a
case at an early stage. The section below details several frequentlyraised jurisdictional objections; it is not exhaustive, as some disputes
give rise to fact-specific objections and space constraints dictate
selecting those most frequently raised.3 °
A.

ProceduralInfirmities

Most investment treaties lay out a number of procedural steps that
claimants must take in submitting their claims to arbitration. These
include: exhausting local remedies for at least a period of time before
seeking relief under a treaty or waiving the right to seek those remedies;
waiting a certain period after the allegedly offending measure is
implemented before submitting a claim; and engaging in mandatory
settlement talks with the host state. Claimants have sometimes sought to
hasten the arbitration process by skipping or truncating these
procedures. 3 ' States have ordinarily protested, but with a few exceptions,
these objections have been unavailing.
For example, in Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, the tribunal
distinguished between true jurisdictional objections, which relate to the
parties have agreed to another expedited procedure for making preliminary objections, a
party may, no later than 30 days after the constitution of the Tribunal ... file an objection
that a claim is manifestly without legal merit."); 2004 U.S. Model BIT, art. 28(4)-28(6);
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., art.
28(4)-28(6), Oct. 25, 2004.
27. See, e.g., David A.R. Williams, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in THE OxFoRD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 12, at 868; MCLACHLAN,
MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 6, at 131-33, 160-64.
28. PSEG Global Inc. et al. (U.S.) v. Turkey, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/05, 352 (Jan. 19, 2007) (Award).
29. The original statement of claim in UPS was filed on April 19, 2000, and the final
award was filed on May 24, 2007. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. (U.S.) v. Canada,
(UNCITRAL) 2 (May 24, 2007) (Award).
30. For an overview of jurisdictional objections raised in NAFTA cases, see
KINNEAR, BJORKLUND& HANNAFORD, supra note 12, at §§ 1101.10-1101.34.
31.

See, e.g., DOLZER& SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 247-53.
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authority of a tribunal to act on the merits, and those relating simply to
procedural provisions, which do not result in an absence of jurisdiction.32
Canada challenged the tribunal's jurisdiction on the grounds, inter alia,
that the claimant submitted its claim six months prior to the entry into
force of the impugned legislation and that the claimant's consent to
arbitration and waiver of its rights to pursue local remedies was not
presented in perfect form..3 3 The question for the tribunal was "[t]o what
extent, if any, is Canada's consent to arbitration in Chapter 11
conditioned absolutely on the fulfillment of specified procedural
requirements at a given time." 34 The tribunal, finding it had jurisdiction,
declined to find that any of these imperfections had done more than
a matter that could be handled in the eventual
cause inconvenience,
35
award of costs.
The tribunal in Waste Management v. Mexico reached the opposite
conclusion about the importance of the waiver. It determined that the
filing of a defective waiver of the right to initiate or continue any
proceedings in local courts required dismissal of the case on grounds of
jurisdiction. The tribunal reasoned that filing the waiver was a condition
precedent to the submission of any claims. 36 The Ethyl tribunal treated
the filing of an appropriate waiver as a question of admissibility, whereas
the Waste Management tribunal viewed it as a question of jurisdiction.
In ADF v. United States, the United States argued, unsuccessfully,
that ADF's Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration was
deficient because it did not adequately specify the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") provisions the United States was alleged
to have breached.3 7

58 (June 24, 1998)
32. Ethyl Corp. (U.S.) v. Canada, (NAFTA/UNCITRAL)
(Award on Jurisdiction), reprintedin 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999) [hereinafter Ethyl Award].
33. Id. at 14.
34.

Id. at

60.

35. Id. The Pope & Talbot tribunal reached a similar conclusion with respect to a
late-filed waiver on behalf of a subsidiary; it was "not willing to attribute such
importance to the requirement for an investment's waiver in Article 1121(1)(b) as to
make that waiver a precondition to the validity of a claim." Pope & Talbot, Inc. (U.S.) v.
17 (Award in Relation to Preliminary Motion by
Canada, (NAFTAIJUNCITRAL)
Government of Canada to strike paragraphs 34 and 103 of the Statement of Claim from
the Record) (Feb. 24, 2000).
36. Waste Management Inc. (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank)
23 (June 2, 2000) (Award). The dissenting arbitrator
Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2,
suggested that the majority had improperly addressed the matter as a question of
jurisdiction rather than admissibility; rather, the question did not go to the authority of the
tribunal to hear the case, but rather to its ability to determine the merits. Id. at 58
(Highet dissenting).
37. ADF Group (Can.) v. United States, ICSID (W.Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1,
129 (Jan. 9, 2003) (Award).
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We find it difficult to conclude that failure on the part of the investor
to set out an exhaustive list of 'other relevant provisions' in its Notice
of Intention to Submit a Claim to Arbitration must result in the loss
of jurisdiction to consider and rely upon any unlisted but
38 pertinent
NAFTA provision in the process of resolving the dispute.
On the other hand, the tribunal upheld the United States' objections with
respect to certain claims based on highway construction projects which
had not been referred to in ADF's Notice of Intent. Because those claims
were neither incidental nor additional to the specific project initially
alleged, as required by the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules
on amending claims, they were deemed inadmissible.39
Procedural formalities have only rarely been successful as bases for
challenges to the jurisdiction of a tribunal. Particularly when it appears
that the procedural flaw did not cause any prejudice to the respondent
insofar as its defense preparations are concerned, or when the objections
have concerned admissibility rather than jurisdiction, the claims have
tended to fail.
B.

Objections Ratione Personae

The nationality of the claimant has played an important role in a
number of investment treaty disputes.
Investment treaties permit
investors that are nationals of one state to submit claims against nationals
of another state. The customary international law principle of nonresponsibility holds that a state has international legal obligations only to
citizens of other states. 40 Thus, a frequent defense is that the claimant
lacks standing to submit a claim because the claimant is not a national of
the other contracting state party. 41 This defense can be raised both when
the claimant is a national of a third state
and when the claimant is
42
itself.
state
host
the
of
national
a
actually
38.
39.
40.

Id. at

134.
144.
See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 459-61

Id. at

(6th ed. 2003) (noting purpose is to establish the nationality of the claim; stating "[t]he
subject-matter of the claim is the individual and his property: the claim is that of the
state.") (citations omitted); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXTS, AND COMMENTARIES 264-65

(2002).
41. See, e.g., MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 6, at 131-62; Roberto
Aguirre Luzi & Ben Love, Individual Nationality in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The
Tension Between Customary International Law and Lex Specialis, in INVESTMENT
TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES III, supra note 17, at 183-208.
42. See, e.g., Victor Pey Casado v. Chile, ICSID (W.Bank) Case No. ARB/98/2,
274, 286 (April 22, 2008) (Award); Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. The United Arab
Emirates, ICSID (W.Bank) Case No. ARB/02/7 (July 7, 2004) (Award); Waguih Elie
George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. Egypt, ICSID (W.Bank) Case No. ARB/05/15 (April
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The underlying issue is whether the protection of the treaty should
be extended to the specific claimant. Has this particular investor made
an investment that brings her within the protection of the BIT? One of
the goals of an investment treaty is to encourage foreign direct
investment, and the protections of the treaty extend only to those who
fulfill the criteria. Some have argued that the customary international
law on nationality, developed in the context of diplomatic protection, is
interacting with the specific language on investor qualifications found in
investment treaties and in the ICSID Convention to create a specialized
law on nationality in the context of investment treaty protection.43
Several investment treaties have provisions against "sham"
corporations-those incorporated in a jurisdiction solely to gain the
protection of a treaty. 4 In the absence of such a provision, States have
not always found it easy to deny those corporations the benefits of the
treaty because of tribunal reluctance to pierce the corporate veil to
identify the "true" ownership of a corporation.45 In a recent case,
however, the tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction because the Dutch
corporation, making the claim against Argentina on behalf of an
46
Argentine corporation, was itself controlled by Argentine nationals.
The tribunal concluded it was entitled to pierce the corporate veil to
identify "the real control and nationality of controllers" in order to
determine whether the requirements of the ICSID Convention (Art.
25(2)(b)) were satisfied.47 Even though the tribunal might not have
pierced the corporate veil for purposes of determining whether the BIT
conferred jurisdiction, it held that a separate inquiry involving veilpiercing was appropriate for purposes of ascertaining the applicability of

11, 2007) (Decision on Jurisdiction); Champion Trading Co. (U.S.) v. Egypt, ICSID
(W.Bank) Case No. ARB/02/9, 16 (Oct. 21, 2003) (Decision on Jurisdiction); Marvin
Roy Feldman Karpa v. Mexico, ICSID (W.Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/99/I (Dec. 6, 2000)
(Interim Decision on Preliminary Jurisdictional Issues); Olguin v. Paraguay, ICSID
(W.Bank) Case No. ARB/98/5 (Aug. 8, 2000) (Decision on Jurisdiction).
43. Aguirre & Love, supra note 41, at 206-08.
44. These are usually called "denial of benefits" clauses. Article 1113 of NAFTA is
an example: "A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another
Party that is an enterprise of such Party and to investments of such investor if investors of
a non-Party own or control the enterprise ....
See, e.g., KINNEAR, BJORKLUND &
HANNAFORD, supra note 12, at §§ 1113.1-1113.13. NAFTA Article 1113 is worded to
permit the denial of benefits to a sham corporation that is owned or controlled by
investors from a non-NAFTA Party-it does not permit a NAFTA Party to deny benefits
if the sham corporation is owned by its own investor. The principle of non-responsibility
must be invoked to object to jurisdiction in such a case.
45. See, e.g., Tokios Tokeles (Lith.) v. Ukraine, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/02/18, 36
(April 29, 2004) (Decision on Jurisdiction).
46. TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. (Neth.) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W.
Bank) ARB/05/5 147-62 (Dec. 19, 2008) (Award).
47. Id. at 1152.
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the ICSID Convention.4 8 Even with a denial of benefits clause, however,
States sometimes have had difficulty proving that a corporation was
controlled by nationals not entitled to claim the protection of the treaty.49
In one much-criticized decision, a claimant's change in nationality
during the pendency of the arbitration served as the successful basis for a
jurisdictional challenge. In The Loewen Group Inc. v. United States, the
Canadian claimant, a funeral home conglomerate, entered into
bankruptcy proceedings and reorganized as a U.S. company.5 ° The new
entity assigned the NAFTA claim to a Canadian subsidiary, Nafcanco,
formed solely to hold the NAFTA claim. The United States argued that
the claimant had become a U.S. company and was therefore not entitled
to maintain its NAFTA claim.51 The tribunal agreed, and dismissed the
claim. The claimant had violated the continuous nationality rule, which
the Loewen tribunal viewed as requiring the claimant to hold the
nationality from the time of the events giving rise to the claim to the date
of its resolution. 52 This decision has given rise to much debate and
criticism, as there is no consensus on what the continuous nationality rule
actually requires.53 Indeed, in 2000 the International Law Commission's
rapporteur on diplomatic protection concluded that there was no rule of
customary international law with respect to continuous nationality

48. Id. at
155-56.
49. See, e.g., Plama Consortium Ltd. (Fr.) v. Bulgaria, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/03/24, $$ 94-95 (Aug. 27, 2008) (Award); Generation Ukraine (U.S.) v. Ukraine,
ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/O0/9,
15.8- 15.9 (Sept. 15, 2003) (Award). In a recent Chapter
11 case, Canada has claimed that the investor, a U.S. national named Vito Gallo, is not an
"investor" because he allegedly paid no consideration for his stake in the Canadian
enterprise that is the investment Canada is alleged to have injured. Vito G. Gallo (U.S.)
v. Canada, (UNCITRAL) 77 161-62 (Sept. 15, 2008) (Statement of Defence).
50. The Loewen Group Inc. (Can.) v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, 220 (June 26, 2003) (Award).
51. A similar claim is at issue in Grand River EnterprisesSix Nations Ltd. v. United
States, in which the United States has alleged that one of the claimants, Arthur Montour,
Jr., has failed to maintain his Canadian nationality at all times from the date that any
claims arose through their resolution and that, even if he has retained Canadian
nationality, he has not shown that it was his dominant and effective nationality to sustain
his ability to assert a claim under Chapter Eleven. Grand River Six Nations Ltd. et al.
(Can.) v. United States, (UNCITRAL) 86 (Aug. 29, 2005) (Statement of Defense of
Respondent United States of America).
52. The Loewen Group Inc. (Can.) v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, T 225 (June 26, 2003) (Award).
53.

See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LA JURISPRUDENCE DU CIRDI 788 (2004); Maurice

Mendelson, The Runaway Train: The "Continuous Nationality" Rule from the
Panavezys-SaldutiskisRailway case to Loewen, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); Noah Rubins, Loewen v.

United States: The Burial of an Investor-StateArbitration Claim, 21 ARB. INT'L 1 (2005);
Jan Paulsson, Continuous Nationalityin Loewen, 20 ARB. INT'L 213 (2004).
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because opinions and practice as to the range of dates on 54which a
claimant must have the requisite nationality had varied so much.
C.

Objections Ratione Materiae

One frequently-raised jurisdictional objection is that the dispute in
question does not involve an investment and thus fails to satisfy the
requirements of the ICSID Convention, the applicable investment treaty,
or both. Most investment treaties have very broad definitions of
investment, and tribunals have tended to take an expansive approach
towards the kinds of projects or commitments of capital that qualify as
investments under investment treaties. 55 Though the definitions in
different treaties vary slightly, they tend to follow a similar formula.
"The formula commences with a wide inclusive phrase and then lists
approximately five specific categories of rights. These categories
contracts, intellectual property rights,
generally include property, shares,
56
and rights conferred by law.",
Disputes brought under the ICSID Convention, whether or not they
are based on a concession contract or on a treaty, must also satisfy the
jurisdictional limitations of the Convention. An investment might fall
within the treaty definition without necessarily meeting the ICSID
Convention's requirements. Article 25 requires that the dispute "arise
out of' an investment, but does not define that term. 57 Tribunals have
thus been forced to decide for themselves what criteria an investment
should meet to qualify for protection under the Convention. The tribunal
in Salini v. Morocco has been extremely influential in this respect.
Building on a decision in Fedax v. Venezuela,58 the Salini tribunal
identified five criteria that an investment should meet to qualify under
the Convention:
(1) duration; (2) regularity of profit and return;
(3) assumption of risk; (4) substantial commitment; and (5) significance
for the host State's development. 59 Many tribunals followed the Salini
tribunal's lead, such that the "Salini test" was, at least for a time, used as
a shorthand for the definition of investment under the ICSID
54. International Law Commission, Report to the International Law Commission on
Diplomatic Protection, A/CN.4/506/Add. 1 (April 20, 2000).
55. See, e.g., Engela C. Schlemmer, Investment, Investor, Nationality, and
Shareholders, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra
note 12, at 49, 55-62; KINNEAR, BJORKLUND & HANNAFORD, supra note 12, at
§§ 1139.22-1139.31; Krishan, supra note 25, at 75-84.
56. MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 6, at 171.
57. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 25(1); SCHREUER, supra note 12, at 121-25.
58. Fedax v. Venezuela, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/96/3 (July 11, 1997)
(Decision on Jurisdiction).
59. Salini Costruttori SpA (Italy) v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/00/4 (Decision on Jurisdiction) (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003).
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Convention. 60
The Salini criteria were derived from Christoph
Schreuer's treatise on the ICSID Convention. 6 ' Professor Schreuer was
not, however, attempting to formulate the definition of investment that
had been excluded from the ICSID Convention; he thought such an
endeavor was premature.6 2 Rather, he was simply describing the
qualities typical of the investments that had been found to satisfy the
jurisdictional criterion of the Convention.6 3
The Salini test has been criticized as too restrictive, and not all
tribunals have followed its lead. For example, the Biwater Gauff Ltd. v.
Tanzania tribunal held that there was no basis for a "rote, or overly strict,
application of the five Salini criteria in every case." 64 The drafters of the
Convention had deliberately left the term "investment" undefined.65 The
tribunal was reluctant, therefore, to restrict its scope, particularly in a
60. See, e.g., Krishan, supra note 25, at 66. Other tribunals that followed the Salini
approach include Joy Mining v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/I 1, 29-30,
41-63 (Aug 6, 2004) (Award on Jurisdiction); Consorzio Groupement LESI-DIPENTA v.
Algeria, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/08,
11:3-28 (Jan. 10, 2005) (Award); Jan
de Nul N.V. v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/13,
90-106 (June 16, 2006)
(Decision on Jurisdiction); Patrick Mitchell v. Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/99/7,
23-41 (Nov. 1, 2006) (Decision on Application for the Annulment of the
Award); Helnan International Hotels A/s v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/05/19, 77 (March 21, 2007) (Decision of the Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction
and Recommendation on Provisional Measures); Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID
(W. Bank) ARB/05/07,
98-100 (March 21, 2007) (Decision on Jurisdiction and
Recommendation on Provisional Measures); Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v.
Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10,
43-148 (May 17, 2007) (Decision
on Jurisdiction).
61. SCHREUER, supra note 14, at 138-41; Krishan, supra note 25, at 67-68.
62. SCHREUER, supra note 14, at 140.
63. SCHREUER, supra note 14, at 140 ("These features should not necessarily be
understood as jurisdictional requirements but merely as typical characteristics of
investments under the Convention."); see also Julian Mortenson, Subverting the Grand
Bargain: Deference and Autonomy in InternationalInvestment Law 24-32 (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author). But see Krishan, supra note 25, at 67-68 (suggesting
that the test arose "from an intellectual collusion between parties counsel, ICSID
arbitrators, and scholars" and suggesting that Professor Schreuer advocated the test for
jurisdictional purposes).
64. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No.ARB/05/22, 312 (July 24, 2008) (Award). The tribunal is not the only critic of the
Salini test; Dev Krishan and Julien Mortenson have also questioned its usefulness and
pedigree. See Krishan, supra note 25; Mortenson, supra note 63, at 32-36. The tribunal
in Pey Casado v. Chile has also questioned the usefulness of the five criteria and
suggested that an investment need have only a monetary contribution of a certain
duration that involves certain risks. Victor Pey Casado et Fondation Presidente Allende
v. Chile, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/98/2, 233 (Award) (May 8, 2008).
65. Julian Mortenson has conducted an in-depth analysis of the travaux prdparatoires
of the Convention to conclude that the drafters intended the definition to be broad, with
the possibility for States individually to identify classes of disputes that they would not
agree to submit to dispute settlement under the Convention. Mortenson, supra note 63, at
51-56.
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manner that would contradict the broad definition of investment in most
BITs.66 The tribunal substituted a more flexible and pragmatic approach
to what constitutes an investment under the Convention. In doing so, it
rejected Tanzania's main argument, which was that an asset without any
value could not qualify as an investment under the treaty.67 Tanzania
claimed that Biwater Gauff had invested in the project knowing it would
be unprofitable but hoping it would lead to more profitable opportunities
later, and that only investments "undertaken on the basis of a reasonable
expectation that the investor will benefit economically" qualify as
investments under the Convention. 68 The Biwater Gauff tribunal refused
to draw any link between a party's motives for entering into an
investment and its ability to qualify for protection under the ICSID
regime.69
Objections based on the lack of an investment have been somewhat
more successful than those based on the procedural requirements in most
investment treaties. 70 Indeed, such objections have become de rigueur
for defendant states.71
D. JurisdictionRatione Temporis
In investment treaty arbitrations, several states have alleged that
tribunals lack jurisdiction ratione temporis because the allegedly
offending events occurred prior to the treaty's entry into force. Most of
the treaties are not retrospective, and so only offer protection against
government measures that occur after the treaty's effective date. As the
investment treaty regime matures, the frequency of these particular
objections will likely diminish. If states follow through on their
warnings of withdrawal from investment treaties, or if states allow their
treaties to lapse when they are due for renewal, we may see objections
ratione temporis on the other end of the treaty's lifespan. These
objections have not been entirely successful, as often the claimant can
point to an extended course of conduct, at least some of which occurred
during the treaty's pendency. They have, however, narrowed the dispute
in some cases, and may have limited the quantum of damages
recoverable.
In Mondev v. United States, for example, the Canadian complainant
challenged several measures taken by city authorities in Boston during

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Biwater Gauff,ICSID Case No.ARB/05/22, at 9 314.
Id. at 9 287-89.
Id. at T 287.
Id. at9321.
See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 247-53.
See, e.g., Krishan, supra note 25, at 19.
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the mid-1980s, which it claimed unfairly limited its ability to exercise its
contractually-protected rights to develop property in central Boston.
Mondev pursued its allegations against the City and the Boston
Redevelopment Authority in Massachusetts state courts, eventually
reaching the state's highest court. The Mondev tribunal recognized the
possibility that an act of continuing character that preceded the entry into
force of the treaty could be the basis for a claim, in contradistinction to
an act which was already complete, but continued to cause loss or
damage. 72 Only that portion of the conduct that post-dates the entry into
force can be the basis for any recovery. Mondev had not, however,
demonstrated that the acts of the City of Boston or the Boston
Redevelopment Authority had the requisite continuing character; thus,
the only claims before the tribunal were those based on the 1995 decision
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.73
NAFTA Chapter Eleven also has a limitations period, which
requires that claims be brought within three years of the date when the
investor "first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the
alleged breach and knowledge that the enterprise has incurred loss or
damage. '' 74 The limitations period succeeded in narrowing the scope of
the claim in question in one case, although in another the tribunal viewed
the existence of a continuing breach as renewing the limitations period.
In Grand River Enterprises v. United States, the claims relate to
measures taken in the aftermath of the settlement in November 1998 of
the litigation brought by several state attorneys general against tobacco
producers. 75 The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), which disposed
of the claims, resulted in a significant increase in the cost of cigarettes
sold by manufacturers who were part of the settlement agreement, a
group that included most major tobacco manufacturers. Smaller nonparticipating tobacco manufacturers began to increase their market share
because their cigarettes were offered at lower prices. U.S. states started
to require those manufacturers who had not participated in the MSA to
pay funds into escrow and to pay civil fines. The claimants in Grand
River had neither deposited the funds nor paid the fines, and claimed
they were unaware of their potential obligations both because they had

72. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 58 (Oct. 11, 2002) (Award).
73. Id. at 75.
74. North American Free Trade Agreement, done at Washington on December 8 and
17, 1992, at Ottawa on December 11 and 17, 1992, and at Mexico City on December 14
and 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
NAFTA arts. 1116(2), 1117(2).
75. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. (Can). v. United States, (UNCITRAL)
(July 20, 2006) (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction).
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not received notice of the fines and penalties and because they had
neither participated in nor had knowledge of the MSA until 2002.
Grand River filed its NAFTA claim in March 2004, and the United
States argued that any measures taken prior to March 2001 should be
excluded from the ambit of the case under NAFTA's limitations period.
The United States was successful with respect to that portion of its
argument, as the evidence showed that Grand River had indeed been
aware of the MSA, and the consequences that would arise if it did not
They did not, however, exclude
join, prior to March 2001.76
consideration of follow-on measures succeeding those introduced prior to
March 2001, even though the United States had argued that those
measures 77should be viewed as complementary to the preceding
measures.
In UPS v. Canada, the tribunal declined to dismiss the claims filed
by UPS on time-bar grounds, even though the complained-of measures
had been introduced more than three years before UPS had filed its
claim. 78 The UPS tribunal found that UPS had alleged a "continuing
breach" such that the limitations period was renewed: "[C]ourses of
of legal obligations and renew the
conduct constitute continuing breaches
79
limitation period accordingly.,
The limitations period has also given rise to estoppel arguments. In
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, the claimant
argued that the limitation should be viewed as having been suspended
during the time that he had tried to work out with Mexico an agreement
to continue his business, and also that Mexico should be estopped from
claiming that any of its acts had occurred prior to the limitations period
because it had assured Feldman that it would respond to his complaints
and allow him to continue his business activities. 80 The Feldman
tribunal dismissed both of Feldman's arguments. First, it noted that the
limitations provisions in NAFTA are straightforward and contain no
suggestion that they should be suspended for any reason. 81 Second,
while the tribunal accepted that the estoppel argument might succeed if
the state had directly acknowledged the existence of a claim, or, in
exceptional circumstances, had by its behavior demonstrated awareness

76. Id. at 82.
77. Id. at 87.
78. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. (U.S.) v. Canada, (UNCITRAL) 28 (June 11,
2007) (Award on the Merits).
79. Id.
80. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, 53 (Dec. 16, 2002) (Award).
81. Id.at 58.

2009]

THE EMERGING CIVILIZATION OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

1285

of the claim, Feldman had fallen short of meeting either of those
criteria.
E.

Frivolous Claims

In the Methanex case, the third case to be brought against the United
States under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, the United States argued that the
case should be dismissed because Methanex "has not-and cannotidentify any substantive standard of customary international law
implicated by the measures here, its claim under Article 1105(1) is
inadmissible. 8 3 This was, effectively, a request for dismissal based on
failure to state a claim for which relief could have been granted.84 The
tribunal dismissed these objections. Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, the tribunal could dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction, but
the tribunal declined to find that jurisdictional objections included those
based on admissibility. 85 According to the Methanex tribunal, the United
States was effectively seeking a definitive interpretation of the relevant
NAFTA provisions, which were questions for the merits.86 Ultimately,
after joining the United States' objections on jurisdiction and
admissibility to the merits, the Methanex tribunal dismissed the
claimant's case for want of jurisdiction because the claimant could not
demonstrate a "legally significant connection" between the U.S.
measures that were alleged to be a breach and its investments.8 7
After facing several claims in NAFTA Chapter Eleven cases, the
United States amended its Model BIT to include a provision on
preliminary objections: "Without prejudice to a tribunal's authority to
address other objections as a preliminary question, a tribunal shall
address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the
respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for
which an award in favor of the claimant may be made under Article

82. Id. at 63.
83. Methanex Corp. (Can.) v. United States, (UNCITRAL)
142 (Aug. 10, 2000)
(Statement of Defense of Respondent United States of America).
84. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) (2009). The Methanex tribunal stated: "The USA's
challenges to admissibility are based upon the legal submission that, even assuming all
the facts alleged by Methanex to be true, there could still never be a breach of the
individual provisions pleaded by Methanex .. " Methanex Corp. (Can) v. United States,
(UNCITRAL) 109 (Aug. 7, 2002) (Partial Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction).
85. Methanex Partial Award, at 124.
86. Id. at 9 120-24.
87. Methanex Corp. (Can.) v. United States, (UNCITRAL) Part IV, Ch. E, 99 10, 22
(Aug. 3, 2005) (Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits); Cf KiNNEAR,
BJORKLUND & HANNAFORD, supra note 12, at §§ 1101.34-1101.40 (other NAFTA
tribunals seem to have applied a less rigorous test of the necessary connection between
the measure and the investment).

1286

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:4

34. ' 88

The revisions to the ICSID Convention arbitration rules and the
ICSID Additional Facility Rules also permit preliminary hearings with
respect to "frivolous claims:"
[A] party may, no later than 30 days after the constitution of the
Tribunal, and in any event before the first session of the Tribunal, file
an objection that a claim is manifestly without legal merit. The party
shall specify as precisely as possible the basis for the objection. The
Tribunal, after giving the parties the opportunity to present their
observations, shall, at its first session or promptly thereafter, notify
the parties of its decision on the objection. The decision of the
Tribunal shall be without prejudice to the right of a party to file an
objection pursuant to paragraph (2) or to 89object, in the course of the
proceeding, that a claim lacks legal merit.

In a twist on the frivolity theme, one tribunal warned that it would
not look kindly on "frivolous" jurisdictional objections. 90 Though
perhaps tongue in cheek, the comment illustrates tribunal concern with
the plethora of jurisdictional objections that have come to be a hallmark
of an investment arbitration.
II.

TRANSPARENCY

Transparency is a broad term that can cover many areas, both
procedural and substantive. Some have argued that investment treaties,
and possibly customary international law, require governments to
maintain a certain level of transparency-openness and predictabilityin their regulatory actions. 91 The extent to which this obligation exists is
beyond the scope of this Article, which will restrict its focus to the

88. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Art. 28(4), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
Trade Sectors/Investment/ModelBIT/assetuploadfile847_6897.pdf.
89. ICSID Conv. Arb. R., Ch. V, R. 41(5); ICSID, Arb. (Additional Facility) R., Ch.
VIII, art. 45(6). Paragraph 2 requires that a jurisdictional objection be filed no later than
the date the counter-memorial is due to be filed or, in the case of an objection to an
ancillary claim, no later than the date the rejoinder is due.
90. Glamis Gold, Ltd. (Can.) v. United States, (UNCITRAL) 9 11 (May 31, 2005)
(Procedural Order No. 2 Revised).
91. The extent to which transparency is a substantive right is unclear. The tribunal
in Metalclad v. United States found such an obligation in the preamble to NAFTA, but
did not ground its decision in customary international law. Metalclad Corp. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 9 70-88 (Aug. 30, 2000)
(Award). The Metalcladtribunal's finding on transparency was set aside by the court in
the place of arbitration on the ground that no transparency obligations had been included
in NAFTA Chapter Eleven, and the tribunal had identified no such obligation in
customary international law that could be imported into Chapter Eleven by means of an
existing provision. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664, 9 66-76
(May 2, 2001).
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procedural aspects of transparency that are starting to characterize
investment arbitration.
Confidentiality is one of the distinctive features of international
commercial arbitration. Most commercial arbitration rules provide for
confidentiality as a matter of course, and the ability to keep the dispute
private is one of the attributes distinguishing arbitration from litigation.9 2
The extent to which confidentiality is an inherent and immutable
part of arbitration is controversial. The English courts have been most
protective of the secrecy of arbitration proceedings. 93 The courts in
Australia, instead of following the lead of the English courts, have said
that particularly in matters touching on the public interest, any
expectation of confidentiality must give way to the public's right to
know. 9 4 Transparency principles are often invoked in opposition to
confidentiality by those who support the claim that the public should
have access to information about arbitrations involving matters of public
concern. Investment arbitration falls within the ambit of arbitrations in
which there is a clear and strong public interest. 95 Particularly in the
NAFTA Chapter Eleven cases, tribunals and state parties to investment
treaties are responding to the public interest in arbitration by making
more information available to the public. Yet, there is no agreement on
the necessary or desirable extent of disclosure in any given case.
Procedural transparency is a catch-all term that is somewhat
imprecise. At the least, it covers access to information that a dispute is
pending. 96 It can also encompass access to government attorneys and
policy-makers who are charged with formulating the position of the

92. This confidentiality has always been subject to abridgement by subsequent setaside proceedings in the courts of the place of arbitration, as most court proceedings are
public. See, e.g., Thomas Carbonneau, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral
Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 213, 234-35 (2005).
93. See, e.g., Hassneh Insurance Co. v. Stewart J. Mew, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243;
Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 643.
94. Esso/BHP v. Plowman, 183 CL. R. 10 (1993); Commonwealth of Australia v.
Cockatoo Dockyard Pty. Ltd., 36 N.S.W. L.R. 662 (1995).
95. See, e.g., Joachim Delaney & Daniel B. Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 1112, at 721,
756 ("In some cases, it is the mere presence of the State or a State entity that gives rise to
the need for transparency. In other cases, it is the subject-matter, the issues at stake, the
political situation in the host State, or the amount of potential financial liability that gives
rise to questions of public interest or public concern and thus, the need for
transparency.").
96. The ICSID Secretariat currently lists all pending arbitrations, but investment
arbitrations held under the rules of other institutions or under the UNCITRAL Rules need
not be made public. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor State Dispute
Settlement, IIA MONITOR No. 1 (2008), at 1-2 (noting the public registry at ICSID that
permits knowledge of those claims); ICSID Conv. Arb. R., Ch. IV, § 1, art. 36(3); ICSID
Arb. (Additional Facility) R., art. 4.
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government with respect to the direction of a dispute. It might include
access to the pleadings of the parties to the dispute, as well as the ability
to attend hearings, possibly via closed-circuit television.97 Often it will
extend to access to awards, or at least to a summary of the result of the
award.98 It might even stretch to participation in the dispute by amici
curiae-individual or groups who have an interest in the subject matter
of the dispute and a desire to participate in it and perhaps influence the
outcome.

A.

99

Access to Information

The trend towards transparency is evident in both contract and
treaty arbitration. The pressure started in disputes brought under
NAFTA Chapter Eleven, with third-parties seeking access to the
pleadings and memorials in pending NAFTA cases. 100 Both the United
States and Canada have strong cultures of open access to government
information: the United States enacted the Freedom of Information Act
in 1966101 and Canada enacted its Access to Information Act in 1985.1°2

Mexico has only recently started a program to increase public access to
government documents. In March 2007, the Mexican Constitution was
amended to103 guarantee a public right of access to government
information.

Although Mexico was initially reluctant, all three NAFTA
governments have agreed to make NAFTA proceedings public. This
agreement extends not only to awards, but also to the memorials and
pleadings filed by the parties. 10 4 Allowing free access to information has
97. See, e.g., Delaney & Magraw, supra note 95, at 743-46.
98. See, e.g., id. at 775-76. The 2006 changes to the ICSID Arbitration Rules and
the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules require the secretariat to publicize
summaries of awards. ICSID Conv. Arb. R., Ch. IV, § 4, art. 48(4) ("The Centre shall
not publish the award without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however,
promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.");
ICSID Arb. (Additional Facility) R., art. 53(3) (same).
99. ICSID Cony. Arb. R., Ch. IV, R. 37(2) (adding procedures for the participation
of non-disputing parties); ICSID Arb. (Additional Facility) R.), Ch. VII, art. 41(3)
(same); Delaney & Magraw, supra note 95, at 777-86.
100.

See, e.g., KINNEAR, BJORKLUND & HANNAFORD, supra note 12, at §§ 1120.28-

1120.35, 1120.47-1120.48; Delaney & Magraw, supra note 95, at 741-50.
101. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).
102. Access to Information Act, R.S.C., ch. A-l, s.1 (1985) (Can.).
103. Decreto por el que se adiciona un Segundo pdirrafo con siete fracciones al
Articiulo 60. do la Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario Oficial
2 (July 20, 2007).
104. NAFTA Note of Interpretation (July 31, 2001). The relevant provisions provide
as follows:
1. Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the
disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and, subject to the application
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by now become the norm in both U.S. and Canadian investment treaty
practice. The U.S. Model BIT and the Canadian Model Foreign
Investment and Promotion Agreement ("Model FIPA") both provide for
transparent proceedings.' 0 5 Moreover, the recent free trade agreement
(FTA) between Canada and Colombia, which is based on the Model
FIPA, provides that documents submitted to, or issued by, an arbitral
06
tribunal be made public, unless the parties agree otherwise. 1
Transparency has not been embraced universally in investment
arbitration. The recent amendments to the ICSID Convention Arbitration
Rules and the ISCID Additional Facility (Arbitration) Rules allow access
of Article 1137(4), nothing in the NAFTA precludes the Parties from providing
public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven
tribunal.
2. In the application of the foregoing:
a. In accordance with Article 1120(2), the NAFTA Parties agree that
nothing in the relevant arbitral rules imposes a general duty of
confidentiality or precludes the Parties from providing public access to
documents submitted to, or issued by, Chapter Eleven tribunals, apart
from the limited specific exceptions set forth expressly in those rules.
b. Each Party agrees to make available to the public in a timely manner all
documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal, subject to
redaction of:
i. confidential business information;
ii. information which is privileged or otherwise protected from
disclosure under the Party's domestic law; and
iii. information which the Party must withhold pursuant to the
relevant arbitral rules, as applied.
c. The Parties reaffirm that disputing parties may disclose to other persons
in connection with the arbitral proceedings such unredacted documents as
they consider necessary for the preparation of their cases, but they shall
ensure that those persons protect the confidential information in such
documents.
d. The Parties further reaffirm that the Governments of Canada, the
United Mexican States and the United States of America may share with
officials of their respective federal, state or provincial governments all
relevant documents in the course of dispute settlement under Chapter
Eleven of NAFTA, including confidential information.
3. The Parties confirm that nothing in this interpretation shall be construed to
require any Party to furnish or allow access to information that it may withhold
in accordance with Articles 2102 or 2105."
Id.
105. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Government of [Country]
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Nov. 2004, art.
29, available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf, Agreement Between
Canada and
For the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fall, 2003, art. 19,
available at -http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agracc/fipa-apie/what fipa.aspx?lang-en#structure.
106. Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and The Republic of Colombia, Nov.
21, 2008, art. 830, availableat http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/colombia-colombie/can-colombia-toc-tdm-can-colombie.aspx.
The Agreement has not yet entered into force.

1290

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:4

to the legal reasoning behind awards in cases administered by ICSID but
expressly provide that awards shall be made public only with the consent
of the parties. 10 7 They also stop short of requiring the disclosure of the
pleadings or the memorials submitted by the parties. Other arbitral
institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and the London Court of
International Arbitration have maintained rules of confidentiality. 10 8 The
UNCITRAL Rules also provide for confidentiality of proceedings.' 0 9 A
working group charged with considering revisions to the UNCITRAL
Rules (which were formulated in 1976) decided to discuss transparency
in investment arbitrations after it finishes revising the basic arbitration
rules.1 10

B.

Amicus Participation

The requests of amici curiae to participate in investment arbitrations
initially occurred in NAFTA Chapter Eleven cases. The first to decide
111
the matter was the tribunal in Methanex Corp. (Can.) v. United States.
It was shortly followed by the tribunal in United ParcelService (U.S.) v.
Canada.'12 NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the applicable arbitration rules
are silent as to the participation of amici, but both the Methanex and UPS
tribunals determined that they had the discretion to accept written briefs
by amici, although amici had no right to participate. Each tribunal
grounded its decision in Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, which gives the tribunal the power to "conduct the arbitration in
such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are
treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party
is given a full opportunity of presenting his case.' 11 3 As the Methanex
107. ICSID Conv. Arb. R., Ch. IV, § 4, 48(5); ICSID Arb. (Additional Facility) R.,
Ch. IX, art. 53(3).
108. Delaney & Magraw, supra note 95, at 739-41.
109. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arb. R., G.A. Res. 31/98, arts.
25(4), 32(5), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Arb. R.], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf.
110. Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), U.N. Comm'n on
Int'l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 49th Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/665 (2008).
111. Methanex Corp. (Can.) v. United States, (UNCITRAL) (Jan. 15, 2001) (Decision
of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae").
112. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Gov't of Canada, (UNCITRAL) (Oct. 17,
2001) (Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici
Curiae). In UPS, the NGOs requested leave to intervene as parties, and in the alternative
requested amicus status. The UPS tribunal determined it did not have the authority to
permit their intervention as full parties, but that they could participate as amici curiae in
appropriate circumstances. Id.
113. UNCITRAL Arb. R., supra note 109, at art. 15(1).
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tribunal stated, "Article 15(1) is intended to provide the broadest
procedural flexibility within fundamental safeguards, to be applied by the
arbitration tribunal to fit the particular needs of the particular
arbitration." 1 14 The UPS tribunal also found that the power conferred by
Article 15(1) "is to be used not only to protect those rights of the parties,
but also to investigate and determine the 5matter subject to arbitration in a
just, efficient and expeditious manner.""
Both the Methanex and UPS tribunals were convened under the
UNCITRAL rules. Their decisions did not directly answer the question
whether ICSID Convention or ICSID Additional Facility tribunals would
have like powers.
Subsequent decisions by tribunals in ICSID
Convention and ICSID Additional Facility cases, however, confirmed
that those rules, although silent on the question of amicus participation,
were sufficiently flexible to permit participation by amici curiae. In
Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A. v. Argentina, an ICSID Convention
tribunal concluded that Article 44 (prior to amendment) conferred on it
the authority to accept amici curiae submissions in appropriate
circumstances. 16 Eventually, in 2006, the ICSID Arbitration Rules and
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules were amended to expressly permit7
the participation by amici curiae, subject to the tribunal's discretion."
In Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania, the tribunal concluded that
it could permit amicus participation based on the newly revised ICSID
Additional Facility Rules." 8
After these decisions, and particularly in light of the revisions in the
applicable ICSID rules, it is almost presumed that investment tribunals
have the authority to permit amici curiae participation.
Permitting amici to participate is predicated on the assumption that
the decision is procedural only and does not affect the substantive rights
of the parties. Initially, in the NAFTA context, Mexico was quite
concerned that the decision was in fact substantive and might affect the
114. Methanex Corp. (Can.) v. United States, (UNCITRAL) at T 27 (Jan. 15, 2001)
(Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici
Curiae").
115. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Gov't of Canada, (UNCITRAL) 69 (Oct.
17, 2001) (Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as
Amici Curiae).
116. Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/17,
11-16 (Mar. 17, 2006) (Order in Response to a Petition for Participation
as Amicus Curiae); see also Aguas Argentinas, S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/19 (May 19, 2005) (Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and
Participation as Amicus Curiae).
117. ICSID Conv. Arb. R., Ch. IV, R. 37(2) (adding procedures for the participation
of non-disputing parties); ICSID Arb. (Additional Facility) R., Ch. VII, art. 41(3) (same).
118. Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. (U.K.) v. Tanzania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/05/22, $T48-55 (Feb. 2, 2007) (Procedural Order No. 5).
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balance of powers in the investment treaty arbitration. In both the
Methanex and UPS cases, Mexico argued that permitting amicus
submissions would result in favoring the court processes of Canada and
the U.S. over Mexico, because Mexican courts do not have amicus
submissions and Chapter Eleven was a delicately balanced compromise
between Mexico's civil law system and the common law legal systems of
Canada and the United States. 11 9 It also seems likely that, because
Mexican courts do not have an amicus-type practice, Mexican NGOs are
likely less familiar with the procedures and strategies involved in filing
such documents.
Similar concerns have caused developing countries to argue against
greater participation by NGOs in WTO dispute settlement. They claim
that NGO participation works to the disadvantage of developing
countries because the NGO sector in the developed world is better
organized, more experienced, and better funded. 12 For example, in
Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, more than 300 aspiring amici wrote a letter
to James Wolfensohn seeking to participate in the case. 12 1 A majority of
the amici came from the developed world, with a large number of groups
from the United States, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom, among others. 122 This geographic divide can give rise
to accusations of uninvited interference with affairs in the developing
world, notwithstanding the often well-meaning motivations of those
NGOs seeking to play a role in a particular case. 123 In addition, there is
119. Methanex Corp. (Can.) v. United States, (UNCITRAL)
11-14 (Oct. 11, 2000)
(1128 Submission of the Government of Mexico); United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v.
Gov't of Canada, (UNCITRAL)
56-57 (Oct. 17, 2001) (Decision of the Tribunal on
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae).
120. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and
International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 275 (1997) ("NGOs from
developing countries may also be less well financed than their industrial country
counterparts and therefore less able to participate effectively."); WTO Minutes of
General Council Meeting (Nov. 22, 2000), WT/GC/M/60, 38 ("[T]he Appellate Body's
approach would also have the implication of putting the developing countries at an even
greater disadvantage in view of the relative unpreparedness of their NGOs who had much
less resources and wherewithal either to send briefs without being solicited or to respond
to invitations for sending such briefs." ) (Comment of India).
121. Demand for Public Participation in Aguas del Tunari S.A. (Bechtel) v. Republic
of Bolivia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/3 (Aug. 29, 2002), available at
http://democracyctr.org/bolivia/investigations/water/intemational-petition.htm.
122. Id.
123. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The ParticipationofAmici Curiae in NAFTA Chapter
Eleven Cases (March 22, 2002) [hereinafter Bjorklund, Participationof Amici] (paper
prepared for the ad hoc experts group on Investment Rules), available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-difflparticipate.aspx?lang-en; Charnovitz, supra note 120, at 275 ("[B]ecause many NGOs are from
industrial countries, they amplify certain views-for example, on human rights or the
environment-that may not be reflective of the views of developing countries.").
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no way to ascertain who precisely is represented by NGOs. They
presumably represent their members, but the extent to which they speak
24
for non-members who share some interest in their mission is not clear. 1
Permitting the filing of amicus briefs adds to the burdens of the
parties, both in terms of attorney time and cost. Deadlines in investment
treaty cases already test the limits of attorney resources, particularly for
government parties who are obliged to obtain acceptance of arguments
within different spheres of the government. Requiring that attorneys
read and respond to amicus arguments will add to the costs of the
proceeding. Arbitrators, too, will need to be paid for the time they spend
reading the briefs and the parties' responses. While one could attempt to
pass that cost on to the NGOs attempting to file briefs, it is not clear that
investment tribunals have the authority to assess such costs, and the more
25
likely result is that the parties will pay for that arbitrator time.
Moreover, at least to date, the amici have tended to support one side in a
given arbitration. While that imbalance may diminish, tribunals will
need to consider the inherent inequality injected into the proceedings
should it permit several amici to submit briefs, especially if they all add
to the arguments to which one side must respond. So long as the groups
have aligned interests, one way to diminish costs would be for the
tribunal to order them to coordinate their arguments to file a single
submission. 26 Tribunals can also enforce page limits and limit amici to
the presentation of those arguments in which they have specialized
expertise.12 There is no question, however, that participation by amici,
particularly in high profile cases, will affect both the internal conduct of
the proceedings and the external perception of the disputes.
The introduction of amici participation into investment arbitration
may be seen as representing a victory of the common law over the civil
law, and of the developed world over the developing world. It pushes
investment arbitration more into a common-law, developed-country
model of civilization, although it is still far short of full-on U.S. style
litigation. This is at best a partial victory-correlative matters have to be

124. See Delaney & Magraw, supra note 95, at 783; see also Peter J. Spiro, NGOs
and Human Rights: Channels of Power, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(Edward J. Elgar ed., forthcoming 2009) (discussing NGO accountability).
125. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide that, in principle, "the costs of the

arbitration shall be borne by the unsuccessful party," although if the tribunal considers it
reasonable, "the arbitral tribunal may apportion [the costs] between the parties...."
UNCITRAL Arb. R., supra note 109, at R. 40(1). The ICSID Additional Facility
Arbitration Rules and the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules presume the costs will be
divided in some manner between the parties, although they do not explicitly so state. See
ICSID Arb. (Additional Facility) R., Ch. IV, art. 58; ICSID Conv. Arb. R., Ch. III, R. 28.
126. See, e.g., Delaney & Magraw, supra note 95, at 781.
127. Bjorklund, ParticipationofAmici, supra note 123.
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decided, and interested parties will likely have widely differing views on
what is appropriate. In addition to the procedural problems mentioned
above is the issue of access to information. The ability of amici to take
full advantage of their position-to know the facts of the case and to
craft their arguments so that they are not duplicative of those of the
parties-depends on access to the parties' pleadings and memorials.
III. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRECEDENT
Investment arbitrations differ from ordinary commercial arbitrations
because public international law plays a significant role in the cases.
Investment tribunals both apply existing law and, arguably, create new
law. While it is axiomatic that decisions of international courts and
as
tribunals do not have formal precedential value, 12 8 it is nearly 129
value.
precedential
practical
a
have
often
decisions
axiomatic that such
This is true for the ICJ and the appellate body of the WTO, and is
increasingly true for investment arbitration.
This process would appear to be unavoidable. Some of the most
frequently involved treated provisions-especially the obligation to
afford fair and equitable treatment-are amorphous and contextually
variable. Other treaty provisions, such as the obligation to provide mostfavored-nation treatment, are ambiguous and controversial in their scope
and effect. Furthermore, certain procedural matters, such as decisions
regarding the place of arbitration, the appropriate allocation of costs, and
the participation of amici curiae, play an important role in arbitrations
but are not addressed thoroughly in investment treaties or in the
130
applicable arbitral rules. Decisions thus fill lacunae in the rules.
These circumstances suggest that common-law oriented civilization is
slowly establishing itself in investment arbitration. Yet civil lawyers are
not strangers to the applicability of case law, and lawyers representing
claimants and respondents from both the common and civil law traditions
are relying on prior cases in making their arguments. These cases are
one of the few sources available to both claimants and respondents when
they are formulating their legal arguments.
Notwithstanding the practical considerations leading arbitrators
towards placing weight on prior decisions, investment arbitration is ill
128. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Awards, supra note 17, at 266;
Commission, supra note 17, at 134; Kaufnann-Kohler, supra note 17, at 357; Schreuer &
Weiniger, supra note 17, at 1189.
129. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Awards, supra note 17, at 266-67;
Commission, supra note 17, at 132-33; Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note 17, at 1190-91.
130. See Forum Panel Discussion, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES Ill,

supra note 17, at 313; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 17, at 368-73; Schreuer & Weiniger,
supra note 17, at 1190-91.
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suited to establish a formal system of precedent. The better analogy, and
the approach towards which investment arbitration is headed, is to the
jurisprudence constante of the French civil law tradition.131 Such an
analogy is appealing for several reasons. First, it recognizes that the
starting point for analysis should be the language of the treaty-just 1as
32
the starting point should be the code in a municipal civil law system.
Secondarily, but not insignificantly, tribunals would then turn to the
decisions of other tribunals interpreting the same or similar treaty
language. These decisions could be viewed as persuasive to the extent
they were well reasoned. 133 Moreover, doctrine would develop through
the accretions' 34of awards decided in a consistent manner-the "method of
small paces."'
Developing a full-fledged system of precedent in investment
arbitration is undesirable for a number of reasons. Most investment
treaties specifically preclude the use of awards as precedent. NAFTA
Chapter Eleven, for example, states "An award made by a tribunal shall
have no binding force except between the parties and in respect of the
particular case."'' 35 This language does not, of course, prevent an award
from being persuasive to the extent it is well-reasoned. 36 Second, it is
questionable whether there is any "system" of investment arbitration at
all. There are more than 2,500 investment treaties, and the obligations
contained in them vary. Differences in the scope and language of137a
treaty provision should, and often do, lead to different outcomes.
Though it would be possible for mini-systems to grow up around
individual treaties, no such structure has yet coalesced. Third, the field
of investment arbitration, while growing rapidly, is still relatively new.
Assigning too great a role to any one decision could lead to the
38
establishment of norms that might soon be viewed as undesirable.

131.

Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Awards, supra note 17, at 272-74;

GAILLARD, supra note 53.

132. Bjorklund, Investment TreatyArbitral Awards, supra note 17, at 272.
133. Id.
134. M. Troper & C. Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France, in INTERPRETING
PRECEDENT, 103, 137-38 (D.N. MacCormick & R.S. Summers eds., 1997).
135. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.- Can.-Mex., Art. 1136, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
136. Jan Paulsson suggests that there are awards.., and awards, some of which will
gain a greater following than others. Paulsson, supra note 17, at 97, 98-99. Anthony
Sinclair has referred to a hierarchy of reason by which the best decisions will gain a
following. Anthony C. Sinclair, The Umbrella Clause Debate, in INVESTMENT TREATY
LAW: CURRENT ISSUES III, supra note 17, at 275, 280.
137. Bjorklund, Investment TreatyArbitral Awards, supra note 17, at 272-73.
138. As discussed previously, earlier tribunals' adoption of the "Salini" test has now
been disavowed by later tribunals, a result that many think is correct. See supra notes 5571 and accompanying text.
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Finally, there is no hierarchy of investment tribunals. In systems of
government using stare decisis, there are formal rules or understandings
about which decisions are binding and which are merely persuasive.
There is a hierarchy of courts in which appellate bodies can correct errors
made by the courts below. In contrast, there are no such hierarchies for
investment arbitration. While the idea of an appellate body charged with
ensuring the development of a cohesive body of law is desirable,
it is, at
39
least at present, neither politically nor practically viable.'
Notwithstanding these obstacles to establishing a formal system of
precedent, the growing body of investment arbitration case law is an
important contribution to investment law and to international law
generally.
Arbitral case law can enhance predictability for both
claimants and host states. As Professor Schreuer has said, "drawing on
the experience of past decisions pays an important role in securing the
necessary uniformity and stability of the law. The need for a coherent
case law is evident. It strengthens the predictability of decisions and
enhances their authority., 1 40 Thus, there is an irony in the use of case
law: the more it establishes norms that are generally accepted, the more it
leads to predictability for states and investors, yet the more awards are
imbued with persuasive authority the more it is possible that they will
impose burdens on states that those states might have been unwilling to
take on directly.
Arbitral case law also plays an important role in developing and
harmonizing investment law. Legal development will likely come faster
in some areas than in others. Resolution may come more readily in areas
in which standards are malleable and tribunals have leeway to interpret
them in any given case. For example, Professor Kaufmann-Kohler has
suggested that resolution of the proper interpretation of the umbrella
139.

Andrea K. Bjorklund, Rapporteur's Report, Improving the International

Investment Law and Policy System,

Second

Annual

Columbia

Conference

on

International Investment (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Schreuer &
Weiniger, supra note 17, at 1202-03. See generally Audley Sheppard & Hugo Warner, et
al., Appeals and Challenges to Investment Treaty Awards: Is it Time for an International

Appellate System?, 2:2 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. (April 2005). There is some possibility
of correcting arbitral awards. The ICSID Convention allows for amendment of awards
on very limited grounds. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 52. Annulment
tribunals do not renew the merits of the underlying tribunal decisions and therefore could
not be looked to as authoritative arbiters on the content or application of the law. The
same could be said about municipal courts that recognize or enforce awards under the
New York Convention: the grounds on which they may review awards are limited. New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, art. 5, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. Moreover, municipal courts from
different states do not form a coherent system on which a hierarchy of authority would be
established.
140.

Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in

Investment Arbitration, 3 TRANSNAT'L DIsp. MGMT. 10 (Apr. 2006).
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clause, which requires a "yes" or "no" decision, will be more difficult
than developing a coherent approach to an issue such as fair and
equitable treatment. 14 1 While the jurisprudence surrounding it is far from
uniform, there does appear to be some coalescence around the idea that
legitimate expectations play a large role in assessing the merits of any
given case. 142
In addition, the extent to which a new rule underscores an existing
norm or expectation may lead to more rapid definition of a legal
principle-one thinks here of the fairly rapid acceptance of the
novel idea in
participation of amici curiae, at least in theory. What was a143
the Methanex case in 2000 is now quite generally accepted.
Law harmonization will come, too, in time. As Jan Paulsson has
said, with respect to substandard arbitral decisions-the unfit will
perish. 144 This process will take time, however, as tribunals experiment
with different solutions to problems. Establishing a jurisprudence
constante requires a patient wait for the development of consistent
applications of the law. Gradually one may expect its institution, and the
emergence of key decisions that are judged to be influential starting
points from which further analysis should flow. The development of
norms through case law is another characteristic feature of investment
arbitration. It is made possible and reinforced by the transparency norm,
which means that prior awards are public and available to counsel and
arbitrators.
IV.

ARBITRATOR ETHICS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The guidelines by which arbitrators regulate their conduct are
important in commercial arbitration as well as in investment disputes. 145
In large part because of the quasi-precedential and public nature of
investment awards, the conduct of arbitrators in investment arbitrations
presents special challenges. As Professor Kaufmann-Kohler has said,
arbitrators, as decision makers, have an obligation to follow precedent

141. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 17, at 29.
142. See Todd J. Grierson-Weiler & Ian A. Laird, Standards of Treatment, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 12, at 259, 275-76,

287-90.
143. See discussion of amici curiae, supra, in the text accompanying notes 111-127.
See also Forum Panel Discussion, supra note 130, at 315-16.
144. Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms:
Treaty Arbitration and InternationalLaw, ICCA 2006, 3:5 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT.
(Dec. 2006).
145.

See, e.g., Loretta Malintoppi, Independence,Impartiality,and Duty of Disclosure

ofArbitrators,in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION,

supra note 12; Leon Trakman, The Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators
Reconsidered, 10 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 999 (2007).
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"so as to foster a normative environment that is predictable," and this
obligation is heightened when a nascent legal system is struggling to
develop rules. 146 The increasing tendency of arbitrators to address prior
decisions is having an interesting, and not yet fully developed, effect on
the conflict-of-interests norms applied to international arbitrators.
Arbitrators have recently been subject to challenge for so-called
"issue" conflicts. If a person sits as an arbitrator in one case while
working as counsel in another, and if the interpretation of a particular
legal rule is a significant issue in each case, is it possible to challenge the
arbitrator on the grounds of issue conflict? Will the arbitrator be inclined
to issue a ruling that will favor her client as she argues the other case?
Will she feel constrained from issuing the ruling she otherwise would
have because of the possibility that it could be used against her client in
the other case? While there is as yet no evidence of any abuse of
authority or process by arbitrators, such concerns have given rise to
challenges against arbitrators. 47 In one such case, Ghana argued that the
arbitrator in question had an issue conflict because he would be
espousing a pro-investor position on the interpretation of an issue of
expropriation law that would be before him in his capacity as arbitrator
in the case against Ghana. 148 The Dutch court charged with hearing the
challenge determined that the arbitrator in question could not fill both the
49
role of arbitrator and maintain his position as counsel in the other case.'
The arbitrator
resigned as counsel and retained his arbitral
50
appointment.

Arbitrators have also been challenged when they serve in two
successive cases that involve similar factual or legal issues. Once the
award in the first case is handed down, the parties in the second case may
146. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 17, at 32-33.
147. See, e.g., Christopher Harris, Arbitrator Bias in Investment and Commercial
Arbitration, 5:4 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT. (July 2008); Barton Legum, Investor-State
Arbitrator Disqualifiedfor Pre-Appointment Statements on Challenged Measures, 21
ARB. INT'L 241 (2005); Judith Levine, Dealing with Arbitrator "Issue Conflicts" in
International Arbitration, Disp. RESOL. J. 60 (Feb./April 2006); Luke Eric Peterson,
Belgian Appeals Court rejects Poland's challenge to Arbitrator in Eureko case,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Switz.), Nov. 15, 2007 [hereinafter Peterson, Eureko],
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn nov15 2007.pdf; Luke Eric Peterson,
Decrying past "contradictory" rulings, Argentina challenges arbitrator,INVESTMENT
TREATY NEWS, July 10, 2008 [hereinafter Peterson, Argentina Challenges Arbitrator];
Luke Eric Peterson, Argentina and UK firm send arbitrator-challengeto venue where
reasons are provided, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Oct. 30, 2007; cf Carbonneau, supra
note 92, at 233 (noting that in the domestic U.S. context, calls for broader disclosures by
arbitrators were prompted by potential, rather than actual, abuse).
148. Republic of Ghana v. Telekom Malaysia Berhad, HA/RK 2004.667, 3 (Oct. 18,
2004).
149. Id. at 4-5.
150. Harris, supra note 147.
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be concerned that the arbitrator has set views on a particular issue and
challenge him on that basis. To date, this kind of challenge has not been
successful. 1' These challenges are made possible by the growing norm
of transparency which means awards are available to the public and thus
can form a ground for challenge. 52 Their lack of success, so far,
depends in large part on the fact that awards are not technically
precedential, even if they exert some persuasive authority.
There is some suggestion of increased scrutiny of associations that
hitherto raised no suspicion of a conflict of interest. Barristers resident
in the same London chambers represent opposing sides in the same case
without violating the ethics rules of the English bar, as the barristers do
not usually practice together. In a recent ICSID case, however, the
tribunal president, David Williams, and counsel for the respondent,
David Mildon, were resident in Essex Court Chambers, and the claimant
challenged Mr. Mildon's continued participation in the case. 153 The
tribunal in that case declined to adopt a blanket rule that an arbitrator
could not share chambers with an attorney appearing before the tribunal
but concluded in that case that Respondent's counsel should resign to
avoid the appearance of a conflict. 15 4 155 Neither party desired the
resignation of the president of the tribunal.
Many lawyers who frequently sit as arbitrators are severing their
relationships with their law firms and even giving up legal practice
entirely, so as to devote themselves full time to arbitration. This enables
them to avoid both the conflicts that inevitably arise for those practicing
in a large firm and the issue conflicts that are increasingly present. But
this solution is perhaps over-broad. While it might eliminate the conflict
a person might experience between her role as counsel and as arbitrator,
it might not be feasible for those who do not have full-fledged arbitration
practices. Moreover, it does not solve the problem of challenges against
151. Peterson, Eureko, supra note 147; Peterson, Argentina Challenges Arbitrator,
supra note 147; Harris, supra note 147, at n.36 and accompanying text.
152. Anthony C. Sinclair & Matthew Gearing, Partiality & Issue Conflicts, 5:4
TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT. (July 2008) (noting greater potential for issue conflicts with
investment arbitration than with ordinary commercial arbitration); Levine, supra note
147, at 62 (same).
153. Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, d.d. (Croatia) v. Slovenia, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/05/24 (May 6, 2008) (Tribunal's Ruling regarding the participation of David
Mildon QC in further stages of the proceedings).
154. Id.at 31.
155. Id. The tribunal was constituted before the respondent retained the barrister
from Essex Court Chambers. Given the fact that neither party desired the resignation of
the president, that the ICSID Convention contains a "cardinal rule" on the immutability
of the tribunal, and various other acts of respondent that concealed the participation of
Mr. Mildon until the proceedings were well launched, the tribunal determined it had the
inherent authority to order the withdrawal of Mr. Mildon as counsel. Id. at
31-34.
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arbitrators who have previously decided cases against a certain party, or
who have previously handled cases with similar legal or factual issues.
Barring arbitrators from sitting in subsequent cases seems to fly in
the face of the desire to have the most well informed, knowledgeable
people possible handle investment disputes. This illustrates the delicate
balance engendered by using ad hoc tribunals to decide investment
arbitrations as compared to the practice of hiring permanent judges in
national courts and in some international tribunals. One usually wants to
nominate the best-qualified person for service on the judicial bench, and
once that person is appointed no one suggests disqualifying her because
she has gained expertise with respect to certain types of cases. Yet in
investment arbitration, a prospective arbitrator with expertise on a
particular issue may be challenged precisely because she or he has that
expertise. This is clearly undesirable. Expertise should not be confused
with bias. An arbitrator may be independent and impartial in her
approach to a case even though she has experience relating to the legal
principles likely to arise in a case; indeed that experience would seem to
be an essential qualification, rather than an essential disqualification.
V.

CONCLUSION

The civilization of investment arbitration has developed defining
characteristics, but its evolution is far from complete. As it matures it
will develop further, borrowing from and refining techniques developed
in other dispute settlement contexts as well as creating new practices
Already investment arbitration
peculiar to investment arbitration.
departs from ordinary commercial arbitration in the number and
frequency of jurisdictional objections offered by states seeking to limit
their liability when faced with cases they often did not foresee. The
burgeoning emphasis on transparency and public participation is at once
a response to the public's fascination with investment arbitration and a
facilitator of that fascination; international commercial arbitration, a
largely private endeavor, has never captured public interest to the same
extent. Investment tribunals are creating a jurisprudence that both
elaborates on existing norms and fills gaps left by incomplete investment
treaties. Arbitrators sitting on these tribunals are playing an important
role in the development of international law, and they are coming under
increased public scrutiny because of the significance of their role.
Despite these identifiable characteristics, it would be premature to
suggest that the civilization of investment arbitration is anywhere near its
full flowering.

